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Introduction 
On a summer day in the year 1445, a strange carriage left Geneva, clattered 
through the city gate and set out for Heidelberg . No less than thirty-six armed 
knights escorted a chunky cart, which was so heavy that it took six horses to draw 
it, while another five had to be kept ready to pull it uphill. The cart was charged 
with large parts of the gold and silver treasures of the dukes of Savoy. With this 
wagonload, Louis of Savoy wanted to contribute to the dowry of his sister Margret 
who had married Louis of the Palatinate.1 The two families had previously agreed 
on the sum of 125,000 Rhenish Guilder that was to be bestowed upon the bride. 
This was a very impressive amount, even if, as one might suspect, this included 
both Margaret’s dowry and trousseau. By way of comparison: the Dukes of 
Habsburg impawned the medium-sized city of Winterthur for 10,000 Guilder at a 
fraction of Margaret’s dowry.2  
What Louis had loaded onto his carriage was no more than a first instalment, 
not even five percent of the total amount he owed his sister and her new husband. 
Just to get this far, Louis had obviously done his utmost and had fetched about all 
there was in the family’s treasure room in the basement of the monastery of 
Plainpalais in Geneva. He had packed the carriage not only with bags of gold coins, 
but also with silver coins, jewelry, dozens of cups, pieces of handicraft such as life-
size silver swans, and even the crown Louis’ father Amadeo had worn before 
becoming counter-pope Felix. Altogether, this was a sumptuous start to a family 
quarrel that was to last.3 
This article examines flows of liquid assets within and among late medieval 
noble families of the Southwest of the Holy Empire. I will advocate intensified 
research into the circulation of coins, jewelry, silverware, and certificates of debt 
within and among families, in particular in connection with weddings and deaths. 
Historical studies frequently mention individual transactions of this kind. In my 
opinion, however, intra-familial flows of liquid assets deserve systematic attention in 
discussions about the organization of families – given that such flows frequently 
                                                          
1 E. CORNAZ, Le mariage palatin de Marguerite de Savoie (1445-1449), 1932 (Mémoires et documents 
publiés par la Société d'historie de la Suisse Romande 2 Serie 15), pp. 39-41. 
2 E. EUGSTER, Die Entwicklung zum kommunalen Territorialstaat, in: Geschichte des Kantons Zürich, 1, 
Frühzeit bis Spätmittelalter, ed. N.F. & M. FLÜELER-GRAUWILER, Zurich 1996, pp. 299-335, here 316. 
3 E. CORNAZ, Le mariage palatin, cit. 
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determined how relationships were constituted, reshaped, or broken. Historians 
have long had a one-sided interest in the nobility’s immovable property, in land, 
castles, towns, and territories, and in how they were passed on from fathers to sons. 
Scholars usually have such patrilines, houses, or dynasties in mind, when referring 
to medieval noble families. Looking into liquid assets, however, raises questions 
about the dynamics of a wide array of additional kin relationships, many of which 
have so far been neglected. Liquid assets did not only flow along male lines of 
succession, but also between fathers and daughters, between brothers and sisters, as 
well as between aunts or uncles and their nephews and nieces.4  
The present article is only in part based on in-depth examinations of primary 
sources and mainly draws on material from specialized publications on the subject 
of medieval nobility. Although such studies rarely focus explicitly on the intra-
familial flow of property, they cannot do so without any mention at all. The 
literature considered comprises monographs – including some rather dated, but 
factually accurate ones – on individual families, studies on family organization and 
the gender structure of noble families, as well as research into hereditary and 
marital property laws. Of particular interest are material that focuses on the 
practical application of relevant legal norms, and finally investigations into how the 
nobility dealt with financial credits. The main focus is on territories north of the 
Alps covering today’s Southern Germany, Switzerland and French Savoy and 
adjacent areas. As the current understanding of how the nobility dealt with liquid 
assets is not developed well enough yet to allow us to pinpoint unambiguous 
distinctions between different groups of nobility, the focus is on higher nobility as 
well as on ministerial nobles. The urban patriciate, however, as far as it can be 
clearly delimited from the latter two groups, has been left out of this investigation.5  
This article aims less at presenting incontrovertible findings, than at suggesting 
possible new investigative directions and research perspectives regarding the 
organizational structure and asset trading of noble families. The article is 
subdivided into three parts. First there are some preliminary remarks on the 
historiography of family organization among medieval nobility. Until recently, 
research into medieval nobilities has been very much based on the assumption of a 
decidedly patrilineal kinship structure in Europe’s late medieval nobility. The 
predominance of patrilinearity has lately been the subject of critical discussion, 
which has opened entirely new perspectives. The second part of the article tries to 
demonstrate how the flow of liquid assets structured relationships – within families, 
among families and even beyond kinship relationships. The third and final part is a 
sketch of a few areas of research where closer inquiries into intrafamilial flows of 
assets appear particularly promising. 
                                                          
4 For recent approaches to the two latter sets of relationships: S. RUPPEL, Verbündete Rivalen. 
Geschwisterbeziehungen im Hochadel des 17. Jahrhunderts, Köln 2006; Tanten, ed. M. HOHKAMP in: 
“Werkstatt Geschichte”, 46, 2007, pp. 3-54.  
5 On the region’s nobility in general: B. ANDENMATTEN, La maison de Savoie et la noblesse vaudoise 
(XIIIe-XIVe s.). Superiorité féodale et autorité princière, Lausanne 2005; Grafen und Herren in Südwestdeutschland 
vom 12. bis ins 17. Jahrhundert, ed. K. ANDERMANN, Epfendorf 2006; R. SABLONIER, Adel im Wandel. 
Eine Untersuchung zur sozialen Situation des ostschweizerischen Adels um 1300, Zurich 2000 (1st ed. 1979). 
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Towards a new understanding of patrilineal family structures 
Since the beginnings of historical kinship research, patrilineal structures have 
been considered particularly characteristic for traditional societies. They kept 
attracting the curiosity of researchers, possibly also because they lent themselves to 
being seen as exotic. This was certainly the case in the 19th century, when scholars 
such as Riehl and LePlay studied rural kinship structures.6 For them – as well as for 
later historians – patrilineality was linked to particularly stable and tight family 
groups which succeeded in passing on “tradition-imbued objects” such as farms, 
castles and entire territories undivided from one generation to the next. The 
capacity of these groups to perpetuate traditions was assumed to result from their 
rigid internal hierarchies and their systematic mechanisms of privileging males over 
females. Sociologists’ modernization theories and historians’ concepts of 
development are both built upon the idea that such rigid family organization was 
necessary to maintain order and stability in societies without state.7 It was not until 
recently that an increasing number of studies in social and gender history have 
begun to question the idea that partilineal family structures compensated for the 
absence of statehood. This has given rise to numerous new questions about intra-
familial circulation of assets, and in a more general sense, about patterns of 
interaction among kin in late medieval nobilities. 
Let us start with some thoughts regarding the current discussion on 
patrilineality in the Middle Ages. Historical kinship research is ultimately still 
engaged in a debate of the theses formulated by George Duby in the 1960s. Duby’s 
ideas, which were a more poignant elaboration of conjectures first put forward by 
the German Karl Schmid, may be summarized as follows.8 Within the nobility of 
Western Europe, the 12th century saw the transition from a bilateral kinship 
organization to a patrilineal one. While kinship and its concomitant inheritance 
claims had been equally handed down on both the maternal and the paternal side in 
the old system, they were exclusively passed on from fathers to sons in the new one 
– similarly to the handing down of family names in most parts of Western Europe 
                                                          
6 W. H. RIEHL, Die Familie, Stuttgart 1861; F. LE PLAY, La réforme sociale en France déduite de 
l’observation comparée des peoples européens, 2vols. Paris 1864. 
7 Cf. S. BRAKENSIEK, Generationengerechtigkeit? Normen und Praxis im Erb- und Ehegüterrecht 1500-
1800. Eine Einführung, in: Generationengerechtigkeit? Normen und Praxis im Erb- und Ehegüterrecht 1500-1850, 
ed. S. BRAKENSIEK, M. STOLLEIS, H. WUNDER, Berlin 2006 (Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, 
Beihefte 37), pp. 1-21, here p. 1; O.G. OEXLE, Les groupes sociaux du moyen âge et les débuts de la sociologie 
contemporaine, in: „Annales ESC“, 1992, pp. 751-765; S. TEUSCHER, Bekannte - Klienten - Verwandte. 
Soziabilität und Politik in der Stadt Bern um 1500, Cologne 1998 (Norm und Struktur. Studien zum 
sozialen Wandel in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit 9), pp. 2-10. 
8 G. DUBY, Structures familiales aristocratiques en France du XIe siècle en rapport avec les structures de l’État, 
in: L’Europe aux IXe et XIe siècles: Aux origines des Etats nationaux, ed. T. MANTEUFFEL, A. GIEYSZTOR, 
Warschau 1968, pp. 57-62; ID., Lignage, noblesse et chevalerie au XIIe siècle dans la région mâconnaise. Une 
révision, in „Annales ESC“, 27, 1972, col. 803-823; K. SCHMID, Zur Problematik von Familie, Sippe und 
Geschlecht, Haus und Dynastie beim mittelalterlichen Adel. Vorfragen zum Thema „Adel und Herrschaft im 
Mittelalter“, in: „Zeitschrift für Geschichte des Oberrheins“, 105, 1957, pp. 1-62. Cf. D. MERTENS, TH. 
ZOTZ, Einleitung der Herausgeber, in: Karl Schmid. Geblüt, Herrschaft, Geschlechterbewusstsein: Grundfragen zum 
Verständnis des Adels im Mittelalter. Aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben, ed. IDEM, Sigmaringen 1998, (Vorträge 
und Forschungen 44), pp. IX-XXXIII. 
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until very recently. Within the old system, identical claims to the parental estate had, 
in principle, been the due of all sons and daughters. Within the new patrilineal 
arrangement, however, only sons were admitted as heirs; in the radicalized concept 
of primogeniture this was even further narrowed down to the first-born son 
exclusively. 
Duby related this transformation to the feudal fragmentation of public power 
in the aftermath of the collapse of the Carolingian Empires. In the 11th century in 
particular, after the disintegration of the early medieval empires in the West and 
before the emergence of the new, late medieval forms of territorial power, local 
counts and seigneurs no longer considered themselves accountable to any central 
authority. Instead they appropriated royal rights of taxation and jurisdiction, and 
used these to establish autonomous local lordships. In this situation, Duby argued, 
patrilinear patterns of family organization helped prevent small seigneuries from 
becoming ever smaller through divisions. Beyond this, patrilinear families became 
an important organizing principle of society. While inheriting sons perpetuated 
their fathers’ social position, the excluded ones descended socially, unless they 
made their luck serving other lords in warfare. They became the stock of 
recruitment of chivalry and the crusades. The daughters, they too excluded from 
inheritance, often married socially inferior retainers of their fathers. They thus 
founded new families that stood in a patron client relationship to their families of 
origin.9 According to Duby, patrilinear family organization thus operated as the 
mechanism generating both the coherence and the hierarchy of feudal society.  
Does Duby’s model explain too much for its own good? This seems to be 
suggested by the model’s many critics. But even they for the most part have rather 
modified than completely refuted Duby’s ideas. In particular works of revisionisms 
that were based on in-depth regional studies came to strikingly similar conclusions 
and converge in three principal points of critique of Duby’s theses: firstly, that the 
passage to patrilinearity was less radical, secondly that it occurred later, and thirdly 
for different reasons than Duby had suggested. In what follows, I would like to 
comment further on each of these points. 
First of all, historians relying on methods of social anthropology stress that 
kinship in Western Europe has at no point become truly patrilineal, but rather 
retained a clear bilateral emphasis at its basis.10 Thus, the ecclesiastic incest 
prohibitions extended equally to kin from the father’s and the mother’s side. This is 
graphically expressed in contemporary diagrams indicating the prohibited degrees 
of kinship, the so-called arbores consanguinitatis.11 Such diagrams were read from the 
centre. Ascending, one found ancestors from the father’s and the mother’s side, 
descending descendants both of one’s sons and daughters. The diagram’s 
                                                          
9 G. DUBY, Au XIIe siècle: Les «jeunes» dans la société aristocratique, in: „Annales ESC“, 19, 1965, pp. 
835-846. 
10 B. JUSSEN, Perspektiven der Verwandtschaftsforschung. Zwanzig Jahre nach Jack Goody’s ‚Entwicklung von 
Ehe und Familie in Europa’, in: Die Familie in der Gesellschaft des Mittelalters, ed. K.-H. SPIESS, Sigmaringen 
2009 (in print); M. MITTERAUER, Warum Europa? Mittelalterliche Grundlagen eines Sonderwegs, München 
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conspicuous symmetry virtually celebrates bilaterality. Medieval commentators of 
these diagrams repeatedly emphasized that they, for the sake of higlighting the 
equality of paternal and maternal kin, are drawn more complex than the mere 
demonstration of incest prohibitions strictly required. (Fig. 1) In contrast to the 
genealogical trees we are familiar with today, the diagrams stemming from before 
1400 entirely refrain from organizing kinship along one main line and its 
ramifications. On the contrary, kinship was here presented as an extended network. 
If the diagrams were interpreted as something figurative at all, they were not seen as 
trees, but rather, as human bodies. Representations of particular kin-relations 
among specified people followed a similar pattern. A particularly expressive 
example is the famous diagram contained in a manuscript of the 13th century Royal 
Chronicle of Cologne that clearly emulates the model of the canon law arbores 
consanguinitatis. Here too, the emphasis is on the network-character of kinship, 
which is not in fact reduced to a linearity of father-son-dyads, but traces some of 
the most important relations between royal families through women.12 
Furthermore, also in the secular sphere, terminologies of kinship, perceptions 
of kinship, and patterns of organizing kin relationships remained bilateral until 
about 1400. Admittedly, from the 12th century onward it was ever more often 
propagated and prescribed that royal fiefs and offices ought to be passed on 
undivided from fathers to their firstborn sons. But even where this was the case, 
both sons and daughters usually still had equal claims to their parents’ allodial, 
freely salable, property.13 
Even a cursory look at historical events in the period before 1400 provides 
evidence of this – as in the instance of the Habsburgs’ conflicts in the Vorlande. 
Time and again such conflicts were in fact ignited by daughters’ hereditary claims– 
even though the lattert were often asserted by their husbands, brothers, or sons. As 
a rule, conflicts rarely escalated between brothers and sisters, but were rather 
deferred for half a generation, and broke out between opposing uncles or aunts and 
their nieces or nephews. Thus, the wars of the 1260s, which set Peter of Savoy 
against Rudolf of Habsburg (who later became King Rudolf) and were fought for 
sections of the Swiss Midlands, sprang from the conflict based on Margaretha of 
Savoy’s inheritance; she was Peter of Savoy’s sister and Rudolf of Habsburg’s 
aunt.14 In the subsequent generation of Habsburgs, Johannes Parricida murdered 
his uncle King Albrecht near Königsfelden (Argovia, Switzerland), according to 
contemporary chroniclers, because the latter had withheld the lordly rights 
Johannes’ late mother had received at her wedding.15 And as late as 1375, in the so-
called Gugler War, Enguerrand VII of Coucy, the son of a Norman nobleman and 
the Habsburg Princess Katharina, invaded the area of contemporary Switzerland 
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with no less than 22,000 mercenaries, in order to drive home his claim for the 
Habsburg townships in Argovia, which his great-uncle Leopold I of Habsburg had 
bequeathed to his mother as collateral for a dowry that was never paid off.16 As in 
this specific case, daughters frequently failed to secure all their inheritance. 
Nevertheless, the actual fact that daughters had a genuine claim to an inheritance 
was never contested. Thus the transition to patrilineal structures was less radical 
than suggested by Duby. 
A second modification of Duby’s model that almost all new kinship studies call 
for, is concerned with its chronology. A growing number of recent microhistorical 
studies agree that even within a fundamentally bilateral kinship system, there 
emerged a trend towards patrilineal succession. However, they point out that this 
transition occurred much later than Duby had assumed. Even in the 12th and 13th 
century, the majority of noble groups in Western Europe still abided by inheritance 
regimes, according to which most property and lordly rights were divided among all 
daughters and sons. Consequently, after each death, lordships were at risk of being 
split and the splits remained available so that they could be re-joined by marriage. 
Only around 1400, and surprisingly simultaneously, the high nobilities in England 
and in the Rhineland, the small nobilities of both Thuringia and the Rhone Valley, 
began to exclude first daughters, then younger sons from succession to lordly 
rights.17 Thus lordly rights became increasingly stable, began to take on 
characteristics of statehood, and were ever more often passed on undivided from 
one generation to the next.  
If patrilinearity spread only as late as the very end of the Middle Ages, we also 
need to revisit its causes. This is the third modification of Duby’s model that many 
recent studies suggest. They no longer relate patrilinearity to the absence of state 
organization, but on the contrary, to its emergence. As long as sons and daughters 
could claim equal shares of their parents’ inheritance, lordships and dominions 
remained unstable in a fairly fundamental sense. Modern constitutional historians 
have found this nightmarish. Yet this system worked out reasonably well in the 
                                                          
16 B. LANG, Der Guglerkrieg. Ein Kapitel Dynastengeschichte im Vorfeld des Sempacherkrieges, Freiburg i. 
Ue. 1982. 
17 K.-H SPIESS, Familie und Verwandtschaft im deutschen Hochadel des Spätmittelalters. 13. bis Anfang des 
16. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart 1993 (Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beihefte 
111); J. MORSEL, Geschlecht als Repräsentation. Beobachtungen zur Verwandtschaftskonstruktion im fränkischen 
Adel des späten Mittelalters, in: Die Repräsentation der Gruppen. Texte - Bilder - Objekte, ed. O.G. OEXLE, A. V. 
HÜLSEN-ESCH, Göttingen 1998, pp. 259-325 (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für 
Geschichte 141); E.I. MINEO, Nobiltà di stato. Famiglie e identita aristocratiche nel tardo medioevo. La Sicilia, 
Roma 2001 (Storia e scienze sociali); J. MATHIEU, Verwandtschaft als historischer Faktor. Schweizer 
Fallstudien und Trends, 1500-1900, in: „Historische Anthropologie“, 10, 2002, p. 225-244; B. DEROUET, 
Political Power, Inheritance, and Kinship Relations: The Unique Features of Southern France (Sixteenth-Eighteenth 
Centuries), in: Kinship in Europe. Approaches to Long-Term Development (1300-1900), ed. D.W. SABEAN, S. 
TEUSCHER, J. MATHIEU, New York-Oxford 2007, pp. 105-124; D. SABEAN, D. WARREN, S. TEUSCHER, 
A New Approach to Long-Term Development, in: Ibid., pp. 1-32; M. HOHKAMP, Sisters, Aunts, and Cousins: 
Familial Architectures and the Political Field in Early Modern Europe, in: Ibid., pp. 91-104; T. RUIZ, From 
Heaven to Earth. The Reordering of Castilian Society 1150-1350, Princeton/N.J. 2004; J. ROGGE, 
Herrschaftsweitergabe, Konfliktregelung und Familienorganisation im fürstlichen Hochadel. Das Beispiel der Wettiner 
von der Mitte des 13. bis zum Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart 2002 (Monographien zur Geschichte des 
Mittelalters 49). 
MALE AND FEMALE INHERITANCE 605
Middle Ages.18 In many ways, it did not reach its limits until the passage to the early 
modern period. Only then were the borders of dominions solidified and their 
administrative structures tightened so that they took on characteristics of modern 
statehood. Attempts to divide such complexes encountered resistance from 
magistrates, bailiffs, councilmen, and parliamentary assemblies. They wanted to 
preserve what they increasingly considered to be their principalities, their counties, 
and their lands.19 Also in the lower nobility, the implementation of patrilinearity 
was related to the consolidation of pre-modern state organization. What was passed 
on from fathers to firstborn sons here, was not principalities, but offices and fiefs 
princes had granted.20 
As Christiane Klapisch has shown, kinship diagrams in the form of actual 
family trees emerged only at this advanced stage in the spread of patrilinearity. 
Among the oldest examples is an illumination showing kin falling under incest 
prohibitions in a French law book from around 1470. The conventional kinship 
diagram is turned upside down to form the new arboreal representation. At the 
bottom, we no longer find descendants, but roots, a stem and the oldest generation, 
further up younger and younger ones.21 Subsequently representations of specific 
families following the same new pattern with its emphasis on linearity emerged. 
Particularly impressive is an arboreal representation of the Habsburg family from 
around 1490, with a compelling symbolism of stalks and buds. Man and woman 
sharing a bud, in cases of repeated marriages a man and several women, is the 
precondition for the germination of new stalks. (Fig. 2) However, these stalks do 
not link mothers, but only fathers with their children. The stalks that lead to sons 
break out of their fathers’ hearts, while they hold the stalks leading to their daughters 
in their hands as these stalks have already been cut off from the stem. In this 
representation, kinship can only be perpetuated along lines between fathers and sons. 
The emergence of such visions of kinship as a relationship conveyed only 
through men and male lines, was possibly facilitated by the growing influence of 
new ideas about conception. Medieval societies had long been dominated by ideas 
based on Galen’s teaching, according to which embryos came about as the result of 
a fusion of male and female semen, two substances that were thought to be similar. 
From the 14th century onward, however, pseudo-Aristotelic texts that intimated a 
clear antecedence of male substance became increasingly widespread. These texts 
taught that the woman only provides amorphous matter, which received its 
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individual shape primarily through the man’s seed.22 To sum up, there is a lot to be 
said against the idea that patrilinear patterns were a archaic vestige of societies 
without state. On the contrary, patrilinearity in Western Europe became widespread 
only in the course of the late Middle Ages and in close connection with the 
emergence of state organization. 
Preponderance of Dowry?  
At the passage to the early modern period, patrilinear conceptions of kin 
organization were highlighted in official representations and acquired an almost 
constitutional status as prescriptions of how lordship should be passed from one 
generation to the next.23 Even though the family trees made in this context 
suppress this, the system of kinship reckoning remained bilateral. So did property 
devolution. The prominently displayed patrilinear transmission of lordly rights went 
along with more discrete transfers of liquid assets through entirely different 
trajectories. In this second part, I will look at how daughters were involved in the 
processes of patrilineal devolution.  
Up to the late 14th century, many noble groups in Europe north of the Alps 
abided by one or the other form of property regime, in which parents left a part of 
their property to their daughters when the latter got married. The groom often 
added an amount similar to the one his bride had received from her parents, and 
the total of these two transfers was considered the woman’s property. These funds 
often consisted of several components with names that varied according to 
localities (dowry, trousseau, dower etc.) each of which was subject to specific, again 
highly local, rules about ownership, utilization and investment. But as a general rule, 
the husband had the formal right to administrate the bulk of his wife’s property. So 
far it has hardly been examined – and it is not easy to examine – to what extent 
wives could exert an informal influence on the use of their funds. At any rate, they 
were supposed to have them at their own free disposal as soon as their husbands 
died. Up to the 14th century, the funds noble daughters received at their weddings 
(the bulk of which often is referred to as dowry) could include lordly rights, castles, 
seigneuries, or towns. Even though women had received such funds on marriage, 
they could, much like their brothers, claim an equal share of the parental estate, 
even though they usually had to subtract what they had already received before 
their parents´ deaths. Historians of gender and of law have demonstrated that the 
changes occurring around 1400 affected not so much these legal norms as such, but 
practices of applying them. Ever more noblemen began to grant their daughters 
dowries and similar transfers only on condition that they “voluntarily” renounced 
to any additional shares of inheritance.24 And, as a general trend, it became unusual 
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that these transfers were granted in the form of lordly rights. Instead daughters 
received cash, rents, and certificates of debts. From around 1500 onward even 
daughters who had no brothers were more and more often excluded from 
succession to lordly rights. The latter were instead, in what was a particularly 
adamant application of principles of patrilinearity, passed on to the closest male in 
their father’s kin. 
While noble daughters were excluded from the succession to lordship, they 
tended to be promised growing and at times very large amounts of money. The 
case of Margaret of Savoy, mentioned in the introduction, was not unique. Truly 
unusual was the dowry and trousseau amounting to 400,000 ducats that Bianca 
Maria Sforza was supposed to bring into her marriage with Maximilian I. But also 
other families of the German high nobility exchanged considerable amounts of 
money: Duchess Sabina of Bavaria was promised a dowry of 32,000 Guilder, on 
condition that she renounced her parents inheritance,25 and even the 20,000 given 
to Catherine of Baden must have been considered to be very substantial by 
contemporaries, especially given the notorious scarcity of cash in princely 
households. Economic historians who analyzed the size of dowries as indicators of 
noble families’ pecuniary circumstances were at first surprised to find that the 
amounts noble daughters brought into their marriages grew around 1400.26 One 
plausible explanation is that this was the price fathers paid to get daughters (and 
their husbands) to renounce their share of the parental inheritance for good. The 
basic rule from 1400 onwards seems now to have been that sons, and preferably 
the oldest son, received immovable property and daughters liquid assets. Thus, 
passing property undivided from fathers to sons seems to have been contingent 
upon new kinds of agreements between fathers and daughters. 
The compensations a daughter received could take on many different forms 
and derive from different funds, but all tended to burden the lordship that was 
passed on along patrilines. If fathers opted for paying the dowry all at once, they 
often had to take loans on their lordship, and if they decided to pay a daughter an 
annuity, it was similar to borrowing on mortgage. To give an idea of how such 
liabilities might have been experienced by main heirs, it seems appropriate to quote 
a statement by a noble Gutsherr from Mecklenburg. Although from the 18th century, 
it was made with reference to an inheritance regime that was still very similar. He 
said that inheriting from his father had made him less a lord, and more like a tenant 
of his mathers27.  
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It seems that many noble families in the 15th century aimed at keeping their 
lordship together, while dividing its returns. Such inheritance arrangements can be 
seen as a simplified variety of the fidei commis appearing at around the same time in 
Southern Europe – but only decades later in the North. The fidei commis allowed for 
passing on an estate undivided over several generations, while its profit could be 
distributed, if necessary according to a complicated plan.28 While an estate in a fidei 
commis became collective property, families of the North charged the so-called sole 
heirs with providing liquid compensations for their siblings.  
The substantial compensation of “excluded” siblings has to be set in relation to 
the considerable debts the main inheritors had to serve. In doing so, it is tempting 
to ask if ultimately several siblings, in practice, collected comparable shares of profit 
from assets, which had, in theory, only been inherited by one of them. It seems not 
entirely inconceivable that a sister received interest on her dowry credits that came 
close to the amount left to her solely inheriting brother after the deduction of such 
interests from the profit of his inheritance. At any rate, it would be interesting to 
examine well-documented individual cases to determine just how unequal “unequal 
inheritance” really was when it came to net incomes each of a group of siblings 
received from their parents’ estate. 
Towards the end of the Middle Ages, some of the most intense clashes among 
noblemen were in fact no longer directly about rights of lordship but about the 
liquid assets these had generated. A rather grotesque example of such a quarrel was 
the one carried out in the Royal Court by Duke Rudolf of Habsburg-Laufenburg 
and Baron Bruno of Rappoltstein, shortly before 1400. Rappoltstein had promised 
to marry his orphaned niece Herzelande to the Habsburg’s son Johannes. After a 
while, however, Rappoltstein realized that he was not able to raise the dowry agreed 
upon.29 In this situation he accepted the surprise offer of another nobleman who 
wanted to take Herzelande in marriage, while offering not only to renounce any 
instant payment from her family, but also to advance her dowry himself. 
Rappoltstein accepted this offer for his niece, even though he had already officially 
wed her to Johannes of Habsburg. The Habsburg, thus cheated out of both bride 
and dowry, accused Rappoltstein in court of having practically auctioned off the 
young woman. Rappoltstein tried to save his hide by means of rather bizarre 
argumentation, claiming that the marriage with the Habsburg could not have been 
consummated because the latter “was not attracted to women.” He maintained that 
Johannes had been taken to Strasbourg, to be treated by “the best doctor available 
there, who would have liked to make him a thing and in a bath had hung much lead 
on his thing, well 50 pounds of weight, and had poulticed him, and yet all to no 
avail.”30 However, the court remained unconvinced, and an imperial ban was 
pronounced on Rappoltstein. 
Such desperate attempts at sneaking out of dowry debts were certainly 
exceptional. It was, however, common to pay compensations in small, at times 
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extremely small instalments and to delay these for long, at times very long periods.31 
However, debts, even more so than paid amounts, constitute dependencies and 
relationships. Debts made it was necessary to beg for delays, to negotiate rents and 
rates or to keep creditors happy with gifts and political compliance.32  
It is worth taking a closer look at some examples of the kinds of relationships 
the circulation (or the non-circulation) of liquid assets entailed. When a sole heir 
had to compensate his sister or daughter, the obvious solution was to turn to the 
liquid assets his wife had received from her family. Yet, it was probably the rule 
rather than the exception that such payments were delayed, which in turn could 
entail financial dependencies among several dynasties. Karl Heinz Spiess has 
described an early, particularly transparent and exemplary instance. (Fig. 3) When 
Agnes of Sponheim got married to Heinrich von Veldenz in 1333, she was 
promised a dowry by her father, Count Simon, and her brother Walram of 
Sponheim. Lacking liquid assets, the two men were unable to pay the promised 
amount and hence pledged to pay her in yearly installments. They did not, however, 
keep this promise either. This was mainly due to the fact that Walram of Sponheim 
and his wife, Elisabeth, had in turn difficulty collecting Elizabeth’s dowry from her 
family of origin. When she had got married three years earlier, Elisabeth’s father, 
Count Wilhelm of Katzenelnbogen had owed her 4000 Guilders of her dowry. 
Shortly before his death in 1331 he made a down payment of 2000 Guilders. 
However, his successor and Elisabeth’s brother, Wilhelm II, delayed further 
payment beyond the year 1333, just at the time when Walram would have badly 
needed the money to compensate his sister Agnes.33 To prevent such chains of 
debts from causing escalating conflicts, families were forced, however grudgingly, to 
cooperate to some extent.  
Many noblemen systematically used outstanding – and therefore in some sense 
liquid capital to provide their daughters with dowries. When count Rudolf III von 
Hohenberg, sold part of his territory in the Rottenburg area to the mighty Duke 
Leopold of Habsburg, the latter did not fully pay what he owed to the seller. 
Hohenberg thus had a positive credit balance with the Habsburgs that he passed on 
to his daughter as a dowry and trousseau when she got married to Margrave 
Bernhard of Baden. After her first husband’s death, Margreth brought these rather 
doubtful liquid assets with her into her second marriage with Count Hermann of 
Sulz. This constellation gave rise to successive conflicts between the Baden and 
Sulz families and then between an alliance of both of them against the Habsburgs.34 
Such situations did not need to last very long before the first persons involved 
died, so that their claims were passed on to the next generation. Thus obligations 
between brothers and sisters became binding for uncles or aunts and their nephews 
or nieces. (Fig. 4) These constellations mark the zone where the boundaries of 
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households are transgressed, where agreements between siblings, who in the 
meantime have children themselves, begin to govern relationships between several 
families, so that the dynamics of a nuclear family are devolved to entire networks of 
kin. In this stage conflicts often escalated around two basic constellations that are 
also frequent motives of popular culture: On the one hand, the rich aunt, the father’s 
sister who accumulated liquid assets. On the other hand, the evil uncle, the mother’s 
brother, who never fully paid her compensation. As far as this kind of schematic 
representations are of any use at all, one could maybe complement the linearity of 
dynastic father-son-successions by the skew geometry of aunt/uncle-niece/nephew 
relationships, which tended to form a pivot of relations between dynasties.  
A good example of this is the story about the large amount owed to Margaret 
of Savoy and her husband. As mentioned in the introduction, Margaret’s brother 
Louis had to fall back on his silverware just to pay the first installment of his sister’s 
dowry and trousseau. It comes as no surprise that the successive installments were 
delayed. In order to find enough money to make one of he payments, Louis had to 
give in pledge an entire Savoyard district, the Châtellanie of Cudrefin on the shores 
of Lake Neuchâtel. Luckily he could redeem the district a few years later thanks to 
the help of his wife, who, after decades of waiting, had finally received another 
installment of her dowry from her family of origin. In successive years, Louis kept 
sending payments to the Palatinate. But he was far from having paid off his debt 
when his sister died 34 years after her wedding. From that moment onward 
Margaret’s son took over the task of quarreling with his mother’s brother, i.e. in the 
classic constellations against an “evil uncle”.35 
Some noblemen had rather spooky encounters with their family’s past, when 
they were confronted with claims to dowries their grandfathers had failed to pay. In 
1536, Ottheinrich of the Palatinate traveled from one court to the next to gain 
support for a claim he finally presented to the King of Poland. (Fig. 5) He claimed 
32,000 ducats of dowry that Polish King Casimir IV had promised his daughter 
Hedewig or Jadwiga – Ottheinrich’s grandmother 60 years earlier, in the year 1475, 
when Hedwig got married to George the Rich of Bavaria. Hedwig had passed on 
her claim to her daughter Margreth, who had also died without being able to collect 
her assets from her mother’s brother. She was the proverbial rich aunt of 
Ottheinrich and bequeathed the old claim to her nephew. The latter could 
eventually collect the dowry, but had to forego the interests accrued throughout the 
preceding sixty years.36  
Examples like this one demonstrate several things. The compensation of noble 
daughters could extend over several generations. Moreover, achieving this required 
peculiar forms of co-operation and conflict management within and among 
families. Real estate property always needs to be balanced in one way or the other 
with liquid assets. It is conceivable that the nobilities north of the Alps at the end 
                                                          
35 E. CORNAZ, Le mariage palatin, cit., pp. 75-78. 
36 J.H. BILLER, Zur Entstehung der Ansichtenfolge, in: Die Reisebilder Pfalzgraf Ottheinrichs aus den Jahren 
1536/37: von seinem Ritt von Neuburg a. d. Donau über Prag nach Krakau und zurück über Breslau, Berlin, 
Wittenberg und Leipzig nach Neuburg, ed. A. MARSCH, J.H. BILLER et al., I-II, Weissenhorn 2001, p. 43-62, 
here pp. 48-53. 
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of the Middle Ages increasingly organized this interdependence in terms of a 
relationship between male and female inheritance. 
In reference to the view that the flows of goods were differentiated by gender, 
one could object that younger sons did not fare differently than daughters. Between 
the 15th and the 17th century, younger sons, too, were ever more often excluded 
from succession to lordly rights and compensated with liquid assets. But excluded 
men frequently remained single, so that their assets fell back to their families of 
origin after death. There was comparatively more regularity and continuity to the 
interdependences between firstborn brothers who succeeded to the estates of their 
fathers and their marrying sisters or, in the next generation, between aunts and 
uncles and their nieces and nephews. There is evidence to suggest that the linear 
transmission of estates from fathers to sons was just the most conspicuous aspect 
of intergenerational property devolution in the late medieval nobility. In the 
background, there was a low profile, but no less important, exchange of liquid 
assets and credits between patrilines. 
Perspectives for future research 
To conclude, I shall summarize three principal findings of the preceding 
discussion and subsequently suggest some questions for future research into late 
medieval nobilities. The results of this paper, include – contrary to still widely held 
beliefs – that patrilineal structures of family organization are not a characteristic 
feature of archaic or traditional societies without states. As far as European 
nobilities are concerned, patrilineal patterns of succession only became widespread 
towards the end of the Middle Ages – and in close connection to intensified state-
building. Secondly, against the background of the persistence of bilateral 
conceptions of kinship, there were hardly any intentions to implement patrilinear 
patterns of succession intransigently. Fathers who wanted to leave their lordships 
undivided and to pass them on to their sons were supposed to compensate their 
daughters with cash. As a result, the consolidation of patrilinear axes of succession 
went along with attempts to generate liquid assets that circulated between patrilines. 
Thirdly, systematic inquiries into such circulations allow for the discussion of late 
medieval nobilities not only with regard to property and lordship, but also to raise 
new questions about income, supply, and credit. These fields came with their own 
sets of constraints and interdependences. 
In order to generate liquid assets, noblemen not only renounced silver swans 
and crowns, but also engaged in personal relationships and dependencies that 
constitute a wide and still little explored field of examination. A great many 
manners in which noblemen engaged in relationships with each other, down to the 
travels of Ottheinrich of the Palatinate, were intimately connected with the 
management of dowry debts. A closer look at practices of negotiating dowries, 
dowry debts and female claims to inheritance could shed new light on 
interdependencies between noble dynasties. I would like to point to just a few fields 
that might prove to be worth closer examination. These include the role of women 
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in the maintenance of kin networks, marriage practices, and the relationships 
between great territorial lords and their minor nobilities. 
Recent studies dealing with the role of women in the maintenance of kin-
networks, in particular during the early modern period, have pointed to the 
importance of relationships between aunts and nieces. This is manifested, among 
other things, by the active and important role many aunts assumed as their nieces’ 
matchmakers.37 Michaela Hohkamp in her work on the German high nobility has 
given particularly vivid descriptions of how aunts suggested suitable matches for 
their nieces and initiated negotiations between families. Hohkamp argues 
convincingly, that this was in part due exactly to the consolidation of inheritance 
along patterns of patrilinearity and primogeniture in the course of the early modern 
period.38 The emergence of these patterns provided women, especially in their role 
as sisters of main heirs, with new and maybe even particularly powerful missions as 
intermediaries between dynasties. One might speculate that this mediating position 
was not solely based on the fact that women themselves were largely excluded from 
rights to succession and so to say, neutral. Of similar importance might have been 
the assets they were due in compensation and the interdependencies constituted by 
outstanding payments. Was the power of the aunts in the domain of matchmaking 
due to the fact that they were rich aunts who disposed of the liquid assets their 
nieces needed for their dowries? Or to express this with the usual delays of 
payment in mind: because an aunt – with her husband’s consent – could renounce 
payments she was owed by her brother (the niece’s father) in favor of that niece?  
A number of marriage patterns would also deserve to be reconsidered from the 
perspective of how families dealt with dowries and dowry debts. From the 15th 
century onward, repeated marriage alliances between the same families seem to 
have become more frequent. French historians in particular, have interpreted this as 
the expression of an ongoing exchange of women according to anthropological 
models. One basic pattern is most famously represented by the marriage of a son 
and a daughter of King Ferdinand of Spain with a daughter and a son of 
Maximilian of Austria. Another pattern can also be illustrated by an example from 
the high nobility. (Fig. 6) The Savoy, through a marriage with Yolande, received a 
woman from the Valois, who returned a woman in the person of Charlotte.39 If we 
take the flow of dowries into consideration, we can interpret the same alliances as 
attempts to set dowries off against each other, so that neither party needed to 
produce them in cash. This seems fairly obvious in the case of exchanges in a 
rhythm of a few years. But given the longevity of dowry debts, to offset a dowry 
owed, may even have been the motivation for arranging a marriage after one, two, 
or even three generations. 
In order to administrate the payments of dowries, noblemen had to activate 
networks that extended far beyond their immediate kin. Many extant marriage 
                                                          
37 M. HOHKAMP, Sisters; cit.; S. RUPPEL, Rivalen, cit., pp. 207-209. 
38 M. HOHKAMP, Sisters, cit. 
39 E.g. G. DELILLE, Famille et proprieté dans le royaume de Naples (XVe-XIXe siècle), Rom 1985 
(Bibliothèque de l'école française de Rome, 259); IDEM, Echanges matrimoniaux entre lignées alternées et 
système européen de l'alliance: un premier approche, in En substances. Textes pour Françoise Héritier, ed. J.-L. 
JAMARD, E. TERRAY, M. XANTHAKOU, Paris 2000, pp. 219-252. 
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contracts indicate persons who were not related to either of the two future spouses, 
acting as mediators of the financial arrangements involved in a marriage: Contracts 
had to be kept in their archive chests, instalments of dowries had to be deposited in 
their castles, and they were capable of enforcing belated payments with their 
knights.40 When princes made debts for dowries, their noble followers often had to 
serve as bondsmen for them.41 At one point when Margaret of Savoy, to return to 
our initial example, had been waiting for a long time for an installment from her 
brother she asked her brother’s bondsmen to assume their duty: they had to spend 
weeks in the so called gisselhaft, a light form of detention in which they had to stay 
until the Prince had paid the amount they had assumed liability for. In practice, this 
implied that inns and taverns in the city of Berne accommodated droves of minor 
Savoyard noblemen who served time as prisoners of a superior kind, enjoying lush 
meals and fine, imported wines – of course at the expense of the debtor, Louis of 
Savoy.42 It would be interesting to know more about the impact of such idiosyncratic 
forms of sociability on the relationship between noblemen and their prince. 
Finally, daughters’ large dowries may also have become a pivotal point in the 
relationship between the smaller nobility and the great territorial princes. Princes 
developed new methods of financing territorial power structures exactly at the 
period when noblemen began to provide their daughters with large dowries. From 
1400 on, even smaller noblemen began to give loans to princes. Noblemen thus 
financed the establishment of princely administrative and military structures, while 
they participated in the princes’ increasing tax returns through the interests on their 
loans. As Bittmann and others have established the money noblemen invested in 
this way often came from their wives’ dowries.43 One might therefore even 
speculate that funding of early statehood was also contingent on the availability of 
the liquid assets noblemen generated to compensate their daughters and sisters.  
I would like to close with these examples. They all demonstrate that a closer 
look at the circulation of liquid assets may open new perspectives on family 
organization in the nobility. The examples, moreover, suggest that there is no 
contradiction between two developments at the end of the Middle Ages, namely 
that members of the nobility disposed of more and more liquid assets on the one 
hand, and that their estates became increasingly stable, indivisible elements of a 
state organization on the other. In the gender logic of noble families these two 
developments were interrelated. While undivided, patrilinieal succession to estates 
established stability, liquidity had to be generated in order to compensate the 
daughters (and their husbands) who no longer received parts of the parental estate. 
Historians have long been focusing primarily on the patrilineal transmission of 
estates. Yet, just as interesting are the flows of liquid assets that criss-crossed 
                                                          
40 Z.B. Rappoltsteiner Urkundenbuch, cit., 3, pp. 82-85, no. 105. 
41 J.-F. POUDRET, Coutumes, cit., 3, pp. 127-137; many examples are to be found in P. WALLISER, 
Das Bürgschaftsrecht in historischer Sicht, dargestellt im Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung des Schuldrechts in den 
Schweizer Kantonen Waadt, Bern und Solothurn bis zum 19. Jh., Basel 1974. 
42 E. CORNAZ, Le mariage palatin, cit., pp. 54-61. 
43 M. BITTMANN, Kreditwirtschaft, cit., D. SCHELER, Rendite und Repräsentation. Der Adel als Landstand 
und landesherrlicher Gläubiger in Jülich und Berg im Spätmittelalter, in “Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter”, 58, 
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between patrilines. Examining the latter allows for systematic approaches to a noble 
economy that was not only about estates, but also about credit, not only about 
lordship, but also about supply, and that was sustained by women as much as men. 
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Fig. 1. Diagram of Consanguinity 
 
Decretum Gratiani, Frankreich, end of 12th century. © Amiens, Bibliothèque Municipale, Ms. 354, fol. 256v 
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Fig. 2. Habsburg Genealogy 
 
(Detail): Painting on parchment, before 1494, © München, Bayerisches Nationalmuseum, NN 1002 
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Fig. 3. Owed Dowries 
 
According to K.-H. SPIESS, Familie und Verwandtschaft im deutschen Hochadel des Spätmittelalters. 13. bis 
Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart 1993. 
Fig. 4. Basic Constellations 
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Fig. 5. Ottheinrichs Claim 
 
According to Die Reisebilder Pfalzgraf Ottheinrichs aus den Jahren 1536/37, ed. A. MARSCH, J.H. BILLER et 
al., I-II, Weissenhorn 2001 
Fig. 6. Exchange of Women 
 
According to P. LAMAISON, Les enjeux de l’alliance, in P. BONTE, Epouser au plus proche: inceste, prohibitions 
et stratégies matrimoniales autour de la Méditerranée, Paris 1994. 
